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Abstract—With the increasing demands for privacy protec-
tion, many privacy-preserving machine learning systems were
proposed in recent years. However, most of them cannot be put
into production due to their slow training and inference speed
caused by the heavy cost of homomorphic encryption and secure
multiparty computation(MPC) methods. To circumvent this, I
proposed a privacy definition which is suitable for large amount
of data in machine learning tasks. Based on that, I showed
that random transformations like linear transformation and
random permutation can well protect privacy. Merging random
transformations and arithmetic sharing together, I designed a
framework for private machine learning with high efficiency and
low computation cost.
Index Terms—Secure Multiparty Computation, Machine
Learning, Neural Network, Privacy Preserving
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning has been widely used in many real-life
scenarios in recent years. In most cases, training machine
learning models requires a large amount of data. For example,
training a neural network to determine whether two pictures
belong to the same person may needs at least tens of thousands
photos, and training a model to predict the possibility of credit
default of someone needs tens of thousands credit records
of different people. Those data are always distributed among
different facilities. On the one hand, many governments have
published the laws against abuses of data in order to protect
people’s privacy and prevent those data from being stolen
for evil uses. On the other hand, the companies do not want
their data being exposed to others. When they want to share
data with others, it’s always difficult to ensure that the other
party will not store their data secretly for usages violates the
contract. So to make different data holders to share their data
and hence to build better machine learning models, privacy-
preserving machine learning technologies must be adopted.
To achieve this, researchers have worked out many solutions,
which can be generalized to two major methods.
• Homomorphic Encryptions. The homomorphic encryp-
tion methods allow arithmetic operations on the cipher-
text. For example, the Paillier cryptosystem [1] supports
additions on ciphertext, and the Gentry cryptosystem
supports both addition and multiplication, which is the
first fully homomorphic encryption scheme. The security
is based on the key length. But up until now, those
methods are way too costly for most applications.
• Secure Multiparty Computation(MPC). MPC methods
provide ways to calculate a function while keep the
inputs private. The most famous scheme is Yao’s garbled
circuit(For details, refer to [2]). There are also MPC
methods based on secret sharing, such as SecureML [3].
Besides, there are also some other techniques to protect
data privacy, like differential privacy and secure aggregation.
Differential privacy methods protect privacy by adding noise to
the data or some intermediate values, while secure aggregation
only applies to federated learning scenarios.
A. My contributions
Existing methods mostly focus on designing a method or
protocol that will leak no information about the raw data.
Like using homomorphic encryption, no attackers can gain any
information about the data in polynomial time w.r.t. security
parameter. However, this definition is not suitable for the data
in machine learning setting. What is necessary is that the
data cannot be reused. So I proposed a metric to quantify
the information leakage during computation, and a practical
method to leverage between privacy preserving and efficiency.
In this paper, I made the following contributions:
• A privacy definition that focus on the possibility on
recovering raw data.
• Proved random transformations, i.e. random linear trans-
formation and random permutation can well protect pri-
vacy.
• Designed a private machine learning framework which
combines random transformation and arithmetic sharing
together and achieves very high efficiency in machine
learning tasks.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Privacy Preserving
Privacy preserving during the data analysis process has long
been concerned. [4] shows that even a few record exposed, the
attacker may be able to locate a specific person in the database.
Various strategies were used in order to maintain privacy.
The k-Anonymity methods is to perturb or hide some of the
attributes which can be used to identify individual records, so
called the ’quasi identifiers’. Beyond it, there are l-diversity
aiming for adding diversity in a group of ’close’ records, and t-
Closeness aiming for make the distribution similar for different
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group of records. However, as the era of machine learning
comes, the amount of data become enormous and the structure
of data is fairly complicated, which is kind of incompatible
with those previous privacy notions.
B. Solutions based on homomorphic encryption
In order to protect privacy, Cryptonets [5] first applied the
fully homomorphic encryption to deep neural network. All
computations are done on the encrypted data. The authors
tested this model on the MNIST dataset, and achieved 99%
accuracy with a throughput about 59000 prediction per hour
and a latency for about 250 seconds. Gazelle [6] avoided
expensive fully homomorphic encryption and used packed ad-
ditive homomorphic encryption to improve efficiency, and used
garbled circuit to calculate non-linear activations. It reduces
single image classification latency to around 30 microseconds.
GELU-Net [7] let client to calculate the activations while
server calculate the linear transformation using additive ho-
momorphic encryption.
C. Multiparty Computing Methods
Yao’s Garbled Circuit first proposed a method for Two-Party
secure computation. GMW protocol [8] extended its work
to multiparty conditions. Aside from boolean circuits, BGW
protocol [9] works on the arithmetic circuits based on Shamir’s
secret sharing scheme [10]. And Beaver [11] used precom-
puted triples to accelerate online multiplication. ABY [12]
mixed arithmetic, boolean and Yao’s sharing together provided
a efficient two-party computation protocol that supports vari-
ous kinds of computations covered common machine learning
functions. while ABY3 [13] hugely improved its efficiency
under 3PC setting. SecureML [3] applied arithmetic sharing
and garbled circuit to linear regression, logistic regression and
neural network.
D. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy was proposed by [14]. It protects
privacy by limiting the change of function when one record
in the data changed. Differential privacy is always achieved
by adding noises somewhere in the data analysis process.
For example, [15] adds the noise in the gradients of training.
PATE [16] applied differential privacy on the lable-generation
phase of teacher models. And the ESA architecture [17] uses
local differential privacy to ensure the worst-case privacy
when all other parties are colluding together.
Those methods all have their advantages: Homomorphic
encryption has perfect privacy with big enough security pa-
rameter; Multiparty computing is faster, it’s absolute secure in
the information theoretic sense as long as the participants keep
semi-honesty; Differential privacy provided a strong tool to
evaluate privacy, and is very simple to implement, even on the
client device. However, the cost for homomorphic encryption
and multiparty computation is still too high to be widely
used. And the differential privacy certainly affects the model
performance in machine learning since noises are added. And
it’s focused on the effect of one record, but not the actual
sensitive data.
III. PRIVACY DEFINITION
A. Reconstructive privacy
In most machine learning scenarios, the data used is a table.
Every row is a training sample and every column is a feature.
The metadatas, i.e. the ID of each row and the attribute name
of each column are very easy to be hide. The only information
exposed is the entries of the data table. In this case, the raw
data are what matters. So I defined reconstructive privacy as
follows:
Definition 1 (-reconstructive privacy). A data transformation
T is said to have -reconstructive privacy under auxiliary
information a if an adversary A with input T (x) and auxiliary
information a has a chance at most  to recover the raw data
x. In other words, for any function A, Ex(p[A(T (x); a) =
x]) < . If there are no auxiliary informations,
For example, consider shuffle on a array of length 5.
Without any other information, the adversary can only guess
randomly. So he has a
1
5!
to get the correct raw data. That
is, the transformation shuffle has a
1
5!
-reconstructive privacy
with no auxiliary information.
Definition 2 (, δ-reconstructive privacy). A data transforma-
tion T is said to have -reconstructive privacy under auxiliary
information a if an adversary A with input T (x) and auxiliary
information a has chance  to recover the raw data x with
error δ. The error definition can be specifically choosed
according to scenario. In other words, for any function A,
Ex(p[|A(T (x); a)− x| < δ]) < .
For example, consider adding noises e ∼ N (0, 1) to a value
x. The adversary get the value x+ e, with auxiliary input that
the variation of noise is 1. so he can guess the real value
is in [x + e − 3, x + e + 3] with a Ψ(3) − Ψ(−3) = 0.997
confidence. That is, the transformation T (x) = x + e has a
0.997, 3-reconstructive privacy.
B. Common Transformations
Linear Transformation: Let raw data be a vector x of
length n. A linear transformation turns x into Ax where
A ∈ Rm×n is a matrix. Calculating the  and δ in linear
transformation’s reconstructive privacy is not trivial. In the
following theorem, I assume that the raw data x and the
elements in matrix A are all random variables drawn from
a standard normal distribution.
Theorem 1 (Linear transformation’s reconstructive privacy).
Let raw data x ∈ Rn be a vector with each element drawn
from the standard normal distribution independently, the same
as matrix A ∈ Rm×n. And let the auxiliary information for
adversary is the x and A both are drawn from standard normal
distribution. The linear transformation T : x → Ax has a
, δ-reconstructive privacy where  < p(|y| < δ) with y ∈
Rn−1, y1, ..., yn−1 ∼ N (0, 1) and p is the density function.
In other words, it’s like the adversary has no information in
n− 1 dimensions of the raw data x.
Proof. First, from the reconstructive privacy’s definition, we
have
Ex(p[|C(Ax)− x| < δ]) <  (1)
Here I use C() to denote adveray’s function to avoid the con-
fusion with transformation matrix A. Since A is also a random
variable, we can change (1) into Ex,AI(|C(Ax) − x| < δ),
where I is a indicator function when the condition satisfies is
1, otherwise is 0.
 =
∫
A,x
p(T = A)p(X = x)I(|C(Ax)− x| < δ)dxdA∫
A,x
p(T = A)p(X = x)dxdA
(2)
Where I uses dx to denote dx1dx2...dxn, and uses dA to
denote dA1,1dA1,2...dAm,n. In order to eliminate the annoy-
ing term C(Ax), we have to do a rotation on x’s coordinates
and extract y = Ax. That produces:∫
y
∫
A
∫
x,Ax=y
p(T = A)p(X = x)I(|C(y)− x| < δ)dvdAdy∫
y
∫
A
∫
x,Ax=y
p(T = A)p(X = x)dvdAdy
(3)
Then how to find the upper bound of ? The intuition
comes from the simple inequality
∫
f(x)dx∫
g(x)dx
≤ max f(x)
g(x)
for f(x), g(x) > 0. Considering the hyperplane Ax = y, the
formula
∫
Ax=y
p(X = x)I(|C(y)− x| < δ)dv∫
Ax=y
p(X = x)dv
is actually the
probability of x lies in the ball B(y, δ) on the hyperplane
Ax = y. Since the marginal distribution on that hyperplane is
still a standard normal distribution, Which can be expressed
by p(z) =
1√
(2pi)n−1
e−|z|
2
. So the upperbound of  is lower
than the probability that the random vector x ∈ Rn−1 has a
length shorter than δ.
The above theorem shows the linear transformation will
reveal no more information than one dimension of the raw
data. Actually, since we used very strong conditions to proof
the upperbound of , the information leakage can be far
less than theory, that is, the adversary can only get a little
information on one dimension of the raw data. Notice that
one dimension does not mean one element in the vector.
Random permutation: Random permutation is a basic
method to hide data. Since a random permutation on a se-
quence of length n can produce n! possibile outcoms, we can
calculate the reconstructive privacy for it:
Theorem 2 (Random permutation’s reconstructive privacy).
Random permutation on an vector of length n has a
1
n!
-
reconstructive privacy.
C. Attacker models
1) Attacker with some part of raw data: Assume raw
data are a collection of samples {x1,x2, ...,xn}(can be also
represented by X) with dimension d. The transformation
matrix A ∈ Rd×f and the transformed data are Y ∈ Rf×n.
and the attacker have some part of raw data {x′1,x′2....,x′m}
with dimension d′ < d. In this case, the attacker’s purpose is
to join the table and get more attributes for his samples. The
attacker have to guess the mapping from his sample to columns
of Y , where there are
(
n
m
)
m! possibilities. And within each
possibility, according to (1), the attacker still have no more
knowledge about n−m−1 dimensions of the raw data. Since(
n
m
)
m! is already big enough, and usually n−m− 1 should
be much larger than 1, so we can say linear transformation is
resilient to this sort of attack. As for random permutation,
the possibilities increases exponentially with the data size.
With large enough data size, the attacker can hardly gain any
knowledge on the raw data.
2) Attacker with knowledge of the transformation: Al-
though it’s hard for attackers to know anything about the
random transformation, since the data holder decides it, but
it is still worth discussion. For random permutations, if the
attacker knows it, the raw data is instantly revealed. In order
to prevent this, local differential privacy can be added. And for
random linear transformations f : Rm → Rn, when n < m,
even if the attacker knows f , he cannot find f−1 since it’s not a
bijective function. One f(x) corresponds to infinite possible x.
Only if the attacker also know the distribution of sample space
{x} and the samples are actually lying on some subspace of
Rm′ and m′ < n, could he have a chance to fully reconstruct
the original data.
D. Extending Raw Data’s Definition
In the discussion above, we refer ’raw data’ as the raw
data value, i.e. a vector, a table. But some times, the numeric
values are not the essence of the data. For example, a online
store gathered milllions of people’s purchase records. It uses
different integers to refer different items and consumers,
denoted by ID. For exmaple, a book is represented by 1, and
a T-shirt is represented by 100. So the whole dataset can be
a matrix where if consumer i bought item j, the entry (i, j)
is 1, otherwise 0. Randomly swaps the ID of two items or
consumers for multiple times, it’s impossible to reconstruct
the original matrix. So does it achieves a ’exponentially
small ’-reconstructive privacy? Of course not. Since the real
information of the dataset is not the interaction matrix. It is the
user-item graph. A graph can have exponentially large number
of adjacent matrices. Although two matrices may look not
like each other at all, but they can be the adjacent matrices
of the same graph. An attcker can get the graph, and with
some background knowledge, i.e. by examing the degrees of
each user node and item node, he can guess which item node
corresponding to which real item. Hence he can use those
data for his own benefit, i.e. training a recommender system.
So are the images. Since convolutional models do the same
linear transformation on different parts of the image, thus,
the relations of different parts of the image is reserved, and
attackers can easily guess the content of the raw image. The
above two cases show that the raw data is not always the
numeric values, but some structure lies inside the numbers. So
in order to achieve privacy preserving, the raw data’s definition
must be carefully chosen by domain experts.
IV. FRAMEWORK DESIGN
In the last section, I showed that the random transformations
can preserve privacy by disabling adversaries to recover raw
data from the transformed data. So it is safe for data holders
to give out its raw data to some third party to perform
computation and the get back the results. To take advantage of
this, I designed a framework merging random transformations
and MPC operations together, in order to perform private
machine learning tasks more efficiently.
A. Arithmetic Sharing
To my knowledge, arithmetic sharing was first formally
proposed on the ABY [12] framework. It’s based on shamir’s
secret sharing scheme [10]. In this paper, I use the 2-party
setting for simplicity.
Shared Value: A value x is shared among parties P0, P1
means that P0 holds a value 〈x〉0 while P1 holds a value 〈x〉1
with the constraint 〈x〉0 + 〈x〉1 = x.
Reconstruction: P0, P1 both send their value some party,
could be one of them or a third-party. The raw value is
reconstructed immediately by summing two values.
Addition: When adding a public value a to a shared value
x, the two parties just add a/2 to their shares of x. When
adding a shared value a to a shared value x, the two parties
just add their shares of a and x respectively.
Multiplication: When multiplying a public value a, the two
parties just multiply their shares by a. Multiplication with a
shared value is kind of tricky. I adopted the beaver triple in
this framework. Suppose multiply shared value x with shared
value y. This requires a precomputed triple uv = w. In the
sense of matrix, the u should have the same shape with x and
v should have the same shape with y. So xy = (x − u)(y −
v) + (x− u)v + u(y − v) + uv. And x− u and y − v can be
public since u and v are shared private values, this formula
can be evaluated in a shared manner. Both parties then shares
the product xy.
B. Adding Random Transformation to Arithmetic Sharing
1) Nonlinear Functions: In traditional MPC systems, the
most difficult and costly part is the computation of nonlinear
functions, including neural network’s activation functions and
logical functions, i.e. comparisons. Existing works mostly uses
garbled circuit or polynomial approximation to calculate them.
These methods result in heavy computation and communica-
tion costs.
By adopting reconstructive privacy, this can be quite easy.
My framework contains several semi-honest third parties who
can perform computation. While P1, P2 contains a shared
vector x, when they wants to compute f(x), where f is
some element-wise nonlinear function, they first get a random
permutation of x, denoted by x′. This can be achieved by
sharing a random seed. Then they send the x′ to a third party
P3 who computes f(x′) and shares it to P1 and P2. Permuting
it back, P1 and P2 then get the shares of f(x).
Element-wise Functions: 1. Each party calculate 〈x′i〉 =
P (〈xi〉) where P is a random permutation. Two parties can
share a secret or sync a random seed in order to produce the
same permutation. 2. Then they reconstruct value x to a third
party P3. P3 computes f(x) then share it to P1 and P2. P1
and P2 then reconstruct the shared value using the inverse
permutation.
2) Distribute Works to Third Party: After appropriate ran-
dom transformations, the data can be securely revealed to
third party, then the third party can fit a model. But only
fitting the model on transformed data, the performance will
certainly dropped since the data are transformed and may lose
some information. But this can be overcome by ’fitting’ the
transformation. A simple example is that two data holders with
vertically partitioned data, then they can just using a local
neural network to produce a hidden layer output with same
shape. Then the third-party added their outputs and perform
further training. In the backward phase, after the third-party
updated its own parameters, it sends back the gradients on the
hidden layer output to two data holders. Using the chain rule,
the data holders are able to calculate their gradients and then
update their parameters. In the third-party’s perspective, since
he knows nothing about the data holders’ local networks, the
local networks can be considered as random transformations.
And with the gradients sent back, the random transformations
are actually learning themselves. So the whole ’shared’ model
can achieve same performance just like a local model.
C. Put it All Together
Combining arithmetic sharing and random transformations
together, the framework mainly provides two functionalities:
1) Addition and multiplication based on secret sharing:
Using additive secret sharing, it’s simple to implement
linear operations including addition, subtraction, and
multiplication including element-wise multiplication and
matrix multiplication.
2) Element-wise non-linear functions: Using random
permutation, the computation of non-linear element-wise
functions can be executed on semi-honest third parties.
3) Computation after transformation: For deep neural
networks, the first layer’s output computation can be ex-
ecuted in the secure way. Then output is revealed to third
party to perform further computation. In the backward
propagation phase, the third party passes gradients to the
parties engaged in the first layer’s computation, probably
in a shared manner.
And the actual implementation depends on different tasks.
For example, logistic regression in federated learning setting,
the data holders first share their data on two semi-honest
servers, with other computation service providers as helpers
of matrix multiplication and performing element-wise function
calculation. For deep convolutional networks, first a few layers
can be performed in a secure way. After that, the output can
be considered as ’random transformed’, so a third party with
strong computation power can do afterwards computation.
V. EXPERIMENTS
A. Implementation
To realize the framework, I uses tensorflow 2.x as the
backend to perform the computations, and all computations
is performed in the eager mode. I uses the GRPC library
for making RPC calls across different parties. As for random
permutation generation and inversion, I uses numpy’s random
generator. I creates a party to deliver all rpc calls according
to the protocol, named the coordinator. When a computation
needs to be performed on a party, i.e. loading a data file, doing
addition, subtraction or matrix multiplication, the coordinator
will generate a string representing the expression. The receiver
party parses the string and do computation according to it.
When the computation is finished, the receiver party saves the
result tensor in its container, and then returns a unique key
to the coordinator. For coordinator, the key is representing
a ’remote tensor’. When one party needs the value of some
other party’s tensor, it also makes a rpc call. The tensor is
serialized by first converting to numpy array and then uses
pickle. Parallel rpc calls is made wherever it is possible. The
computation can be composition of basic computations in
order to reduce number of rpc calls.
B. Dataset and System Settings
I used the MNIST dataset for experiments. The MNIST
dataset contains 55000 images of handwriten digits from
number 0-9, equally numbered. Each image is of 8-bits gray
scale and size 28 28. The label is a one hot vector of length
10 indicating the image belong to which number. I used 50000
images for training and 5000 for validating. During training
and validating, the image pixel values are is scaled to [0,1) by
multiply 1/256. The experiment is executed on a cloud server
which has 16 processor cores of frequency 2.5GHz and 64GB
memory, and a Tesla T4 GPU. All the parties are simulated
by individual python processes.
C. Logistic Regression
I tested the framework with logistic regression on the
MNIST dataset. In order to use element-wise functions, I used
sigmoid function as the activation function instead of softmax,
since softmax is not element-wise. So the model is:
y = sigmoid(xW + b) where sigmoid(z) =
1
1 + e−z
(4)
z = xW + b is securely calculated by arithmetic sharing and
the sigmoid function is calculated with random permutation by
a third-party different from the party provides beaver triplets
for shared multiplication.
In the experiment, the batch size is set to 32 and the learning
rate is set to 0.1. Mean squared loss and SGD optimization
is used. I recorded the elapsed time and accuracy on the
validation set every 100 batches. Total train batches is 10000.
D. Neural Network
I also tested neural network with one hidden layer of size
64. Considering the label alone does not reveal any useful
information, I let first layer’s output computed by arithmetic
sharing and then feed it to a neural network. The network only
gets the linear-transformed output. According to reconstructive
privacy notion, it does not reveal any useful information. And
the loss function is cross entropy. The other settings are the
same as the logistic regression experiment.
Fig. 1. Training curve of logistic regression. Orange: training locally; Blue:
training by the framework.
Fig. 2. Training curve of DNN. Orange: training locally; Blue: training by
the framework.
E. Conclusion
Figure 1 shows that training curves of local training and
training by the framework of logistic regression. And figure 2
shows the curve of DNN. Using my framework and training
locally, the curves are almost the same. It’s not surprise since
my framework has almost zero precision loss. However, as
table I shows, the training time is still a lot longer than training
locally. It takes 30x-100x more time than training locally.
But compared methods based on homomorphic encryption and
MPC, it’s still fast enough. The inference time is only 0.06s for
one image, while SecureML [3] taking 4.88s and CryptoNets
[5] taking 297.5s for inferencing one image.
TABLE I
TRAINING TIME
Framework Local
Model Logistic DNN Logistic DNN
Training time(s) 1981 1179 22 63
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposed a new privacy notion called reconstruc-
tive privacy. Unlike differential privacy, this privacy notion
focuses on the probability of reconstructing useful information
from the transformed data. Based on this, random transfor-
mations can be applied for private machine learning. After
the data transformed, third party computation servicers can
perform computations on the transformed data. Comparing
with methods based on homomorphic encryptions or garbled
circuits, this method hugely reduces the computation costs.
But this method also need strong assumptions. The attackers is
assumed to know nothing about the distribution of the raw data
or the random transformations. If the raw data are sparse, i.e.
words, rating histories or in graph form, i.e. social relations,
the reconstructive privacy is hard to compute. The computation
cost of reconstructing the raw data should also be considered.
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